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NATIONALIST MOBILIZATION IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST DURING  
THE CLOSING PHASE OF THE CIVIL WAR
Three major factions in the Russian Civil War in the Far East engaged in nationalist mobilization 
coming up with different rhetorical tropes and images in the 1920–1922 period. The ultra-royalist 
faction led by Mikhail Konstantinovich Diterikhs, which in 1922 controlled the Provisional Priamur 
Government in Vladivostok, portrayed the Romanovs as redeemers who had ended the “dark age” of 
the Time of Troubles (1598–1613) and called for a new Zemskii Sobor to elect a Romanov Tsar for the 
sake of new redemption from the “foreign” Bolsheviks. The socialist faction of the Far Eastern Repub-
lic (FER), taken over by the Bolsheviks, focused on the grievances caused by the Romanovs’ policies 
and the clashes with Japan and stressed the future role of the Russians as the first nation of toilers to 
lead the global struggle for social justice. The popular monarchist faction, established by Grigorii 
Mikhailovich Semenov, tried to find a middle ground by emphasising the popular role in ending the 
Time of Troubles and agitating for an elected muzhik Tsar. The ultra-royalist and monarchist rhetoric 
failed to mobilize the people of the Far East who did not identify with the Eurocentric images of the 
past and rebuked the cooperation between the monarchists and Japan. The socialist claims that the 
Romanovs and the Japanese accounted for the degraded present proved more relevant in view of the 
regional historical narrative featuring a series of conflicts with East Asian states, while the economic 
rather than racial interpretation of the Japanese policies and the inclusive character of socialism did 
not alienate ethnic minorities from the socialist faction. Refs 22.
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И. В. Саблин
НАЦИОНАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ  
НА РОССИЙСКОМ ДАЛЬНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ  
НА ЗАКЛЮЧИТЕЛЬНОМ ЭТАПЕ ГРАЖДАНСКОЙ ВОЙНЫ
Гражданская война в азиатской части бывшей Российской империи не закончилась с па-
дением режима Александра Васильевича Колчака. На российском Дальнем Востоке ее активная 
фаза продолжалась по крайней мере до 1922 г. На завершающем этапе конфликта (1920–1922 гг.) 
три основные группировки апеллировали к  националистическим образам с  целью мобилиза-
ции местного населения. Ультрароялисты под предводительством Михаила Константиновича 
Дитерихса, которым в 1922 г. удалось установить контроль над Временным Приамурским прави-
тельством с центром во Владивостоке, представляли Романовых в качестве спасителей в период 
Смутного времени (1598–1613 гг.) и призывали созвать новый Земский собор для выборов царя 
из Дома Романовых во имя спасения от «чужеземных» большевиков. Социалисты — большеви-
ки, меньшевики, эсеры и другие группировки — акцентировали внимание населения на страда-
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ниях, вызванных политикой Романовых и столкновениями с Японией, и подчеркивали будущую 
роль русских как первой нации трудящихся в глобальной борьбе за социальную справедливость. 
Несмотря на контроль большевиков над Дальневосточной республикой (ДВР), умеренные соци-
алисты смогли продолжать свою деятельность до конца 1922 г. Народно-монархическая (право-
популистская) группировка, созданная Григорием Михайловичем Семеновым, пытаясь найти 
компромисс, апеллировала к идее спасения в ходе Смутного времени, но при этом подчеркивала 
роль народа в этом спасении и потому призывала к выборам мужицкого царя. Ультрароялист-
ская и монархическая риторика оказалась бесполезной в мобилизации населения Дальнего Вос-
тока, которое не солидаризировалось с европоцентристскими образами прошлого и осуждало 
сотрудничество монархистов с Японией. Возложение на Романовых и японцев ответственности 
за упадок соответствовало основному нарративу региональной истории, построенному на серии 
конфликтов с восточноазиатскими государствами, в то время как экономические, а не расовые 
интерпретации японской политики и инклюзивный характер социализма не привели к разрыву 
социалистов с национальными меньшинствами. В статье деятельность указанных группировок 
рассматривается с точки зрения конструктивистского и экономического подходов к националь-
ной мобилизации. Исследование вводит в научный оборот документы из фондов Российского 
государственного исторического архива Дальнего Востока (г. Владивосток) и Государственного 
архива Хабаровского края (г. Хабаровск). Библиогр. 22 назв.
Ключевые слова: Гражданская война, национализм, Дальний Восток, социализм, монар-
хизм.
In the summer of 1922 the Russian Monarchic Society “The Faith, the Tsar, and the 
People” circulated a proclamation in Vladivostok. In this proclamation, Metropolitan An-
tonii of the Russian Orthodox Church appealed to the anti-Bolshevik military forces in 
the Maritime Region, mainly the kappelevtsy and the semenovtsy (the forces formerly un-
der the command of Vladimir Oskarovich Kappel’ and Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov), 
and called for creating a people’s volunteer corps for defending “the rights of the faith and 
the Russian tradition.” Antonii drew a direct connection between the Russian Civil War — 
which in the Russian Far East protracted at least until 1922 thanks to the Japanese military 
presence and involved the creation of the Far Eastern Republic (FER, 1920–1922), the 
Provisional Priamur Government (1921–1922), and several other competing state for-
mations — and the Time of Troubles (1598–1613) claiming that his appeals were identi-
cal to those the “Nizhny Novgorod Army” made on its way to Moscow in 1612. Antonii 
nevertheless muted the popular element of the nationalist historical myth by stressing its 
monarchist and anti-foreign aspects and putting the 1612–1613 events in line with the 
Kazan campaign of Ivan the Terrible (1552) and the Polish campaign of Alexei Mikhailov-
ich (1654). According to Antonii, the main objective of the new volunteer corps was to 
revive the old “Russian Orthodox Russia” with “a Tsar from the decendants of Patriarch 
Filaret and Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov” [Obrashchenie mitropolita Antoniia 1922, 
ll. 395–396]. 
The proclamation was part of a massive propaganda campaign launched by the crum-
bling Vladivostok-based Provisional Priamur Government under Spiridon Dionis’evich 
Merkulov which challenged the Bolshevik-dominated Chita-based Far Eastern Republic 
from May of 1921. It was not only the anticipated withdrawal of Japanese forces which ac-
counted for the crisis, but also the constant splits among the anti-socialists (first, between 
Merkulov and Semenov and later between Merkulov and the kappelevtsy who handed 
dictatorial powers to Mikhail Konstantinovich Diterikhs in the summer of 1922) caused 
by personal rivalries and the disagreements about the ideological foundations of the anti-
Bolshevik struggle [Mukhachev 2003]. Having united in negative terms in response to the 
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predominantly socialist FER (as the anti-socialists), the Vladivostok government desper-
ately needed an idea which could mobilize the Far Eastern population. Even though na-
tionalism seemed best suited for popular mobilization, it had to be defined and communi-
cated to the people who were expected to give their lives for a particular political faction. 
Furthermore, the socialist coalition which stood at the foundation of the FER and was 
taken over by the Bolsheviks by 1922 also engaged in nationalist popular mobilization.
The struggle between the FER and the Provisional Priamur Government, as well as 
within the two [Azarenkov 2001], led to emergence of three major nationalist narratives 
which could be loosely attached to three competing factions (ultra-loyalist, socialist, and 
popular monarchist). The first faction, represented by Antonii, can be referred to as the 
ultra-royalists due to their unconditional support for monarchy and the Romanov family. 
This faction, which received the backing of Diterikhs in 1922, portrayed the Romanovs as 
redeemers who ended the “dark age” of the Time of Troubles and called for a new Zemskii 
Sobor to elect a new Romanov Tsar for the sake of new redemption from the “foreign” 
Bolsheviks, who were deemed German spies [Memorandum po delu monarkhicheskikh 
organizatsii 1922, ll. 33–36 ob.]. In this respect the nationalist myth which interpreted the 
Time of Troubles as the Polish occupation rather than a complex political crisis of early 
modern Russia was to be replayed in the Far East. Vladivostok was supposed to simulta-
neously take the place of Nizhny Novgorod (as the center of mobilization and the starting 
point of a campaign directed at Moscow) and of Moscow (as the site of the Zemskii Sobor). 
The second, Bolshevik-dominated socialist faction (first, under Aleksandr Mikhailov-
ich Krasnoshchekov and later under Iakov Davidovich Ianson, Nikolai Mikhailovich Mat-
veev, and others), which effectively controlled the FER since the autumn of 1920, was at 
the opposite side of the political spectrum. It put forward a type of socialist nationalism 
which was popular in the late Russian Empire and especially after the February Revolu-
tion of 1917 and promoted by the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), the Mensheviks, and 
minority socialist nationalist parties (the Jewish Labor Bund, the Armenian Revolution-
ary Federation, and others). In the Far East, where the SRs and Mensheviks retained some 
space for political activism despite the already ongoing repressions, socialists focused on 
the grievances caused by the Romanovs’ policies and the clashes with Japan and stressed 
the future role of the Russians as the first nation of toilers in leading the global struggle 
for social justice, in the form of World Revolution or by setting an example of progressive 
reforms. The Bolsheviks not only adopted the rhetoric of their socialist opponents, but 
also managed to strip this version of nationalism of its democratic connotations putting 
forward the so-called “democratic centralism” and the dictatorship of the proletariat in-
stead. Despite their anti-democratic stance, they remained in the realm of republicanism, 
at least rhetorically. 
Seeking to broaden the popular support of the anti-Bolshevik movement, but at the 
same time fearing to alienate radical monarchists, Semenov launched the creation of the 
third, popular monarchist faction. He tried to find a middle ground between ultra-roy-
alists and republicans by appealing to the redemption narrative of the Time of Troubles, 
but stressing the popular role in ending the “dark age” and agitating for an elected mu-
zhik Tsar. Semenov circulated a dubious document, “the Manifesto of the Russian Peasant 
Party” ostensibly adopted in Nizhny Novgorod but most likely composed and printed in 
Transbaikalia, which called for making Semenov “the Russian Peasant Dictator” already in 
the spring of 1920 [Prikaz 1920, ll. 83–84 ob.] and later for electing a peasant (or at least a 
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Cossack) Tsar. In the summer of 1921, a pamphlet called The Muzhik Tsar was circulated 
in Vladivostok. Although Semenov himself was outplayed by Merkulov and was forced 
to leave the Russian Far East in 1921, his supporters joined the newly formed society 
“The Tsar and the People.” “The Tsar and the People,” which soon transformed into the 
above-mentioned “The Faith, the Tsar, and the People,” was also backed by Merkulov and 
Diterikhs which blurred its affiliation to either of the two monarchist projects [Memoran-
dum po delu monarkhicheskikh organizatsii 1922, ll. 33–36 ob.]. 
Despite these organizational entanglements, the two approaches to monarchist re-
vival could still be traced in the documents. Apart from that, there certainly was a liberal 
view of nationalism in the Far East represented, for instance, by the Constitutional Demo-
crats Lev Afanas’evich Krol’ and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Vinogradov [Krol’ 1921], but 
the liberals failed to achieve prominence either in the Far Eastern Republic or the Priamur 
State Formation and became irrelevant for the fighting factions in the summer and fall 
of 1922. Their vision nevertheless heavily influenced Semenov’s rhetoric, while the more 
liberally-inclined trade and industrialist delegates of the Priamur Zemskii Sobor created 
an opposition to the ultra-royalists there [Mukhachev 2003]. 
The key questions of this article are how the three dominant nationalist narratives, 
socialist, ultra-royalist, and popular monarchist, differed from one another and why 
the Bolshevik-backed socialist rendering of the Russian nation succeeded: in the fall of 
1922  the FER joined Soviet Russia through a parliamentary decision which caused no 
major protests in the region, while the Far Eastern monarchists failed to attract broad 
support not only in the region, but also in emigré circles. A combination of economic and 
constructivist approaches to studying nationalist mobilization helped grasping the differ-
ences between the three narratives and explaining the ineffectiveness of the monarchist 
mobilization. 
Nationalist mobilization includes formulation and utilization of past and present 
grievances of the population and articulation of its potential gains by political actors [Re-
gan and Norton 2005]. Here not only unfavourable economic conditions [Fearon and 
Laitin 2003], but also the solutions for economic and social problems offered by political 
actors play a major role. According to the Far Eastern and Siberian representatives in 
the State Duma of the Russian Empire, the failures of the Romanovs’ foreign policy and 
subsequent clashes with the Qing Empire during the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), which 
featured the Battles on the Amur River and an anti-Chinese pogrom in Blagoveshchensk, 
with Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), and ultimately with the Central Pow-
ers in the Great War (1914–1918) contributed to death, suffering, impoverishment, and 
other grievances of the Far Eastern population. The Tsarist domestic policies, including 
the refusal to introduce zemstvo self-government in the region, suppression of economic 
initiative, and abolition of the regional free trade zone [Gosudarstvennaia duma, chetver-
tyi sozyv, chetvertaia sessiia 1916, col. 2701–2713], also contributed to the emergence of 
the “degraded present” [Levinger and Lytle 2001]. 
Although the Bolsheviks were considered by many to be the initiators of the Civil War 
[Obrashchenie atamana Semenova 1920, l. 54], it was Japan’s intervention and the activities 
of its Russian allies, Semenov and Merkulov, which protracted the crisis. Speaking at the 
constituent conference of the FER in the fall of 1920, Matveev described the intervention as 
occupation. “[W]e did not see Russian people, peasants, we saw Japanese, Koreans, Chinese. 
Through the window of the railway car it seemed that we traveled across a foreign coun-
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try and not across the Russian Maritime Region.” At the same conference, Krasnoshchekov 
stressed, however, that it was not a racial conflict between Europe and Asia, contrary to a 
prominent imperial discourse of the “yellow peril” [Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2001], 
but an economic one between the imperialists and the toilers. He called the Chinese and 
Koreans brothers and condemned Japanese imperialism [Protokol 1920, ll. 1–15 ob.]. 
The socialists also offered a solution to the economic grievances of the regional pop-
ulation promising to ensure the right of workers “to build its own life freely” in a peace-
ful context. Unlike the ultra-royalists and popular monarchists, the socialists muted the 
slogans of class warfare and claimed that they sought peace [Protokol 1920, ll. 1–15 ob.]. 
Despite the violent policies of Soviet Russia, the anti-war rhetoric made the Far Eastern 
socialists much more attractive to the regional population than their contenders who ap-
peared to campaign for the continuation of the Civil War. The Bolsheviks did not dismiss 
the possibility of violence, but an operation against the Provisional Priamur Government 
and, possibly, against the Japanese in the Maritime Region was expected to be much short-
er and therefore less damaging for the regional population than the Moscow campaign 
advocated by Antonii and his political allies. Instead of offering the people intelligible 
economic gains in the future, the anti-Bolsheviks in Vladivostok tried to prove that the 
Provisional Priamur Government had already saved the population from the grievances 
similar to that in Soviet Russia, “the horrors of the unprecedented famine that spread 
across whole Russia.” Since the people had already achieved economic gains, they now 
were expected to become the heroes who were ready to fight and die “for the great Russian 
idea” [Ot komiteta 1922, l. 146].
Apart from dealing with the past and present grievances of the Far Eastern popula-
tion and articulating their future gains, the three factions also had to outline the imagined 
community with which the people could identify. Given that all three factions used Rus-
sian and none of them engaged in anti-religious policies (including the Bolsheviks in the 
FER), it was not language or religion [Anderson 1991], but rather history and destiny 
which were supposed to consolidate the Russian imagined community and mobilize the 
population [Coakley 2004]. The theory of collective action frames proved especially help-
ful when grasping the differences between and evaluating the effectiveness of the three 
factions [Levinger and Lytle 2001]. 
All three factions agreed on the, perhaps, exaggerated depictions of the degraded 
present (though they held different actors accountable for the crisis), but had different ap-
proaches to the past and the future. The ultra-royalists and popular monarchists focused 
on the idealized images of the past. Contrary to Antonii’s appeals to the deeds of indi-
vidual tsars, Semenov’s faction stressed the role of the people in ensuring this idealized 
past in 1920. The non-partisan nature of the peasantry was supposed to bring “peace to 
all the people of Russia” and destroy all other parties “which only ruined Russia by their 
arguments, quarrels, fights and murders” [Obrashchenie atamana Semenova 1920, l. 54]. 
In 1922  “The Faith, the Tsar, and the People” continued this line of argumentation by 
stressing the non-partisan nature of monarchy in its appeals to the peasants, workers, and 
Cossacks [Obrashchenie k krest’ianam 1922, l. 397] and therefore its capability to bring 
back the “golden age” free from party politics.
Unlike the monarchists, the Bolsheviks did not offer any idealized images of the past, 
apart from the most recent past of the February Revolution and the Civil War which liber-
ated the people and the “age of struggle” pertaining to settler colonization of Siberia and the 
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Russian Far East. The recent past was in fact the starting point of the new future, in which 
the Russian nation had to play a special role. Speaking at the session of the Provisional Peo-
ple’s Assembly of the Far East in the summer of 1920, before the unification of the FER, 
the Menshevik Aleksei Ivanovich Kabtsan put the interests of the nation in front of those 
of the class. The main objective of the socialists was to secure the Far East for the Russian 
state, which, according to Kabtsan, only Soviet Russia could do. Even though the Far Eastern 
Mensheviks opposed the Soviet political system, they were ready to sacrifice democracy to 
national unity. For Kabtsan there were in fact no contradictions between the interests of the 
nation and the class in the Russian case anymore. Since the interests of the toilers (workers, 
peasants, and some intellectuals) coincided with “the interests of the development of the 
whole society,” the workers substituted the bourgeoisie as the leader of the Russian society 
and “the carrier of the national idea” [Stenograficheskii otchet 1920, ll. 1–15]. 
Although the Bolsheviks dismissed the notion of class and political compromise and 
persecuted their socialist opponents in the Russian Far East in 1921–1922, as in Soviet 
Russia, they took over the discourses of the Mensheviks and the SRs and stressed the na-
tional unity of the toilers in the Far East and Soviet Russia when explaining the liquidation 
of the FER in November 1922. Some Bolsheviks also pointed that the independence of the 
FER was irrelevant in view of the continuing global civil war, in which Soviet Russia as the 
country of the “insurgent proletarians” needed the efforts of all Russian toilers [Otchet 
o rabote 1923, ll. 1–9]. Besides, the proletarian interpretation of the Russian nation did 
not make other nations its natural opponents. On the contrary, the cooperation between 
socialists of various backgrounds after the February Revolution and the readiness of the 
Bolsheviks to support autonomies of post-imperial minorities after 1918, as well as their 
internationalist agenda, made the socialist version of nationalism inclusive and therefore 
acceptable for the non-Russian population of the region [Suny 1993]. 
With the idea of global solidarity of the toilers in their quest for social justice taken 
up by the socialists, “The Faith, the Tsar, and the People” attempted to find alternative 
connections between welfare, internationalism, and monarchy in order to reach the peas-
ants, Cossacks, and workers. Mikhail Fedorovich was credited for “putting an end to all 
troubles” in Russia in 1613. Alexander II was called the Liberator who “personally eman-
cipated the many-millioned peasantry.” Alexander III, the Peacemaker, was said to be the 
first in the world to “found the international tribunal” of all powers for the sake of “limit-
ing arms and ending all wars.” The last appeal, which the authors of the proclamation had 
to clarify to their audience by noting that the tribunal was located in The Hague, reflected 
the monarchists’ desperate attempts to translate elitist internationalism to the population 
[Obrashchenie k krest’ianam 1922, l. 397].
The elitist suggestion to revoke the Russian Revolution of 1917 was also very hard to 
explain to the Far Eastern population. In his attempts to prove the damage of the revo-
lution and to mitigate the explicit Eurocentrism of the Russian historical myths barely 
relevant to Siberia and the Far East, Antonii appealed to the figure of Fedor Mikhailovich 
Dostoevskii. Turning the writer into a prophet who foresaw “the bloody mutiny,” Antonii 
claimed that Dostoevskii located Russia’s future in Siberia which would launch the “new 
great revival” of Russia [Obrashchenie mitropolita Antoniia 1922, l. 395]. Here Antonii 
attempted to utilize the ideas of Siberian Regionalism (Oblastnichestvo) which reserved 
a special role for Asian Russia, but these ideas developed by regional intellectuals over 
the nineteenth century were of little use for the monarchist cause. Not only were the dis-
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cussions of Siberia’s special role launched by the exiled Decembrists and later developed 
mainly by socialists and liberals, but they also featured extensive criticism of European 
Russia in its Moscow and Saint Petersburg emanations and numerous demands for de-
mocratization and federalization in line with the North American example [Bassin 2006]. 
The images of penal servitude, banishment, and heresy which were ascribed to Siberia 
in the master narrative of Russian history [Remnev 2007], together with the special role 
played by Polish political exiles in the history of the region and its general religious and 
ethnic diversity, made Siberian Regionalism useless for the ultra-royalist project [Gosu-
darstvennaia duma, chetvertyi sozyv, chetvertaia sessiia 1916, pp. 2701–2713].
The Bolsheviks were more successful in dealing with the region’s peculiar history, 
providing its nuanced rendering. The Bolsheviks effectively used the ideas of Siberian 
Regionalists when comparing North Asia to North America and applauding the efforts of 
the Russian settlers in turning the “no man’s land” into a part of “human civilization.” At 
the same time, during the liquidation of the FER they dismissed the main Regionalist idea 
that Asian Russia was a colony of European Russia and denounced the claims for regional 
autonomy [Otchet o rabote 1923, ll. 1–9; Protokol 1920, ll. 1–15 ob.]. 
The references to the recent past of the February Revolution and the Civil War and 
to the Russian settlement efforts, as well as the redefinition of the Russian nation as a na-
tion of toilers, proved to be much more relevant (or at least less irrelevant) to the regional 
population than the appeals to the Time of Troubles, Russian tsars, and even the recent 
Great War made by the monarchists. The monarchists failed to convince the population 
to fight against the alleged German spies and sacrifice themselves for the sake of revoking 
the Russian Revolution of 1917. The popular monarchists failed to create a middle ground 
between ultra-royalists and liberals. Although the Zemskii Sobor convened in the sum-
mer of 1922 in Vladivostok, its participants did not reinstate monarchy, while the House 
of the Romanovs did not offer any candidates for the throne and did not even respond to 
the invitations of the Far Eastern monarchists [Memorandum po delu monarkhicheskikh 
organizatsii 1922, ll. 33–36 ob.].
The people of the Far East did not identify with the Eurocentric images of the past 
put forward by the monarchists and rebuked their cooperation with Japan. The socialist 
claims that the Romanovs and the Japanese accounted for the degraded present proved 
more relevant in view of the regional historical narratives, while the economic rather than 
racial interpretation of the Japanese policies and the inclusive character of socialism did 
not alienate minorities from the socialist faction. 
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